Fleet management has a "soft" threat model — most operators don't have a
state-actor adversary. The threats are mundane, but they show up in real audits
+ real lawsuits + real driver-union disputes:
Location data leaking to ad SDKs
The free routing app a driver installed bundles three location-collecting SDKs. Now the driver's daily route, dwell times at customer sites, and home address sit in a third-party data broker. Per-app network gating + sensor scopes shut these down without breaking the routing app's primary function.
Hours-of-Service falsification
An ELD that runs unsigned + can be remote-rooted is an ELD whose log can be edited. Hardware attestation on every heartbeat means your back-office knows the device is the device. The signed event stream means the timestamp can't be backdated by a driver who got pulled into a weigh station.
Driver privacy in collective bargaining
Unions fight invasive monitoring. The surveillance ceiling — kernel-enforced, no tier can override — neutralizes the "we're recording your microphone" allegation at the OS level. Auditable: any tier policy that tries to enable it is rejected before it reaches the device.
Phone theft at a truck stop
Devices walk off. Duress PIN wipes irrevocably. Auto-reboot on idle clears the decryption keys. Hardware attestation means a swapped phone can't impersonate the original on dispatch.
Cargo-targeted attacks
Cargo theft rings monitor dispatch traffic. Per-connection MAC randomization, DNS-leak prevention, VPN tunnel enforcement. The dispatcher app can't be bypassed onto a hostile Wi-Fi at a truck stop.
Last-mile delivery fraud
Photo-of-delivery scams: a driver photographs an empty doorstep + claims delivery. Storage scopes mean the camera-and-evidence app sees only its own folder; the device-attested timestamp + GPS coordinates land in your audit log signed; harder to fake.